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BANDIT LEARNING IN CONCAVE N -PERSON GAMES
MARIO BRAVO♯, DAVID S. LESLIE‡, AND PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS∗
Abstract. This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit
feedback in non-cooperative concave games. The bandit framework accounts
for extremely low-information environments where the agents may not even
know they are playing a game; as such, the agents’ most sensible choice in this
setting would be to employ a no-regret learning algorithm. In general, this
does not mean that the players’ behavior stabilizes in the long run: no-regret
learning may lead to cycles, even with perfect gradient information. However,
if a standard monotonicity condition is satisfied, our analysis shows that no-
regret learning based on mirror descent with bandit feedback converges to
Nash equilibrium with probability 1. We also derive an upper bound for the
convergence rate of the process that nearly matches the best attainable rate
for single-agent bandit stochastic optimization.
1. Introduction
The bane of decision-making in an unknown environment is regret: noone wants
to realize in hindsight that the decision policy they employed was strictly inferior
to a plain policy prescribing the same action throughout. For obvious reasons,
this issue becomes considerably more intricate when the decision-maker is subject
to situational uncertainty and the “fog of war”: when the only information at the
optimizer’s disposal is the reward obtained from a given action (the so-called “ban-
dit” framework), is it even possible to design a no-regret policy? Especially in
the context of online convex optimization (repeated decision problems with contin-
uous action sets and convex costs), this problem becomes even more challenging
because the decision-maker typically needs to infer gradient information from the
observation of a single scalar. Nonetheless, despite this extra degree of difficulty,
this question has been shown to admit a positive answer: regret minimization is
possible, even with bandit feedback (Flaxman et al., 2005; Kleinberg, 2004).
In this paper, we consider a multi-agent extension of this framework where, at
each stage n = 1, 2, . . . , of a repeated decision process, the reward of an agent is
determined by the actions of all agents via a fixed mechanism: a non-cooperative
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N -person game. In general, the agents – or players – might be completely oblivious
to this mechanism, perhaps even ignoring its existence: for instance, when choosing
how much to bid for a good in an online auction, an agent is typically unaware of
who the other bidders are, what are their specific valuations, etc. Hence, lacking
any knowledge about the game, it is only natural to assume that agents will at
least seek to achieve a minimal worst-case guarantee and minimize their regret. As
a result, a fundamental question that arises is a) whether the agents’ sequence of
actions stabilizes to a rationally admissible state under no-regret learning; and b) if
it does, whether convergence is affected by the information available to the agents.
Related work. In finite games, no-regret learning guarantees that the players’ time-
averaged, empirical frequency of play converges to the game’s set of coarse corre-
lated equilibria (CCE), and the rate of this convergence is O(1/n) for (λ, µ)-smooth
games (Foster et al., 2016; Syrgkanis et al., 2015). In general however, this set might
contain highly subpar, rationally inadmissible strategies: for instance, Viossat and
Zapechelnyuk (2013) provide examples of CCE that assign positive selection proba-
bility only to strictly dominated strategies. In the class of potential games, Cohen
et al. (2017) recently showed that the actual sequence of play (i.e., the sequence
of actions that determine the agents’ rewards at each stage) converges under no-
regret learning, even with bandit feedback. Outside this class however, the players’
chosen actions may cycle in perpetuity, even in simple, two-player zero-sum games
with full information (Mertikopoulos et al., 2018a,b); in fact, depending on the
parameters of the players’ learning process, agents could even exhibit a fully un-
predictable, aperiodic and chaotic behavior (Palaiopanos et al., 2017). As such,
without further assumptions in place, no-regret learning in a multi-agent setting
does not necessarily imply convergence to a unilaterally stable, equilibrium state.
In the broader context of games with continuous action sets (the focal point of
this paper), the long-run behavior of no-regret learning is significantly more chal-
lenging to analyze. In the case of mixed-strategy learning, Perkins and Leslie (2014)
and Perkins et al. (2017) showed that mixed-stratgy learning based on stochastic
fictitious play converges to an ε-perturbed Nash equilibrium in potential games
(but may lead to as much as O(εn) regret in the process). More relevant for our
purposes is the analysis of Nesterov (2009) who showed that the time-averaged
sequence of play induced by a no-regret dual averaging (DA) process with noisy
gradient feedback converges to Nash equilibrium in monotone games (a class which,
in turn, contains all concave potential games).
The closest antecedent to our approach is the recent work of Mertikopoulos and
Zhou (2018) who showed that the actual sequence of play generated by dual av-
eraging converges to Nash equilibrium in the class of variationally stable games
(which includes all monotone games). To do so, the authors first showed that a
naturally associated continuous-time dynamical system converges, and then used
the so-called asymptotic pseudotrajectory (APT) framework of Benaïm (1999) to
translate this result to discrete time. Similar APT techniques were also used in
a very recent preprint by Bervoets et al. (2018) to establish the convergence of a
payoff-based learning algorithm in two classes of one-dimensional concave games:
games with strategic complements, and ordinal potential games with isolated equi-
libria. The algorithm of Bervoets et al. (2018) can be seen as a special case of
mirror descent coupled with a two-point gradient estimation process, suggesting
several interesting links with our paper.
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Our contributions. In this paper, we drop all feedback assumptions and we focus
on the bandit framework where the only information at the players’ disposal is the
payoffs they receive at each stage. As we discussed above, this lack of information
complicates matters considerably because players must now estimate their payoff
gradients from their observed rewards. What makes matters even worse is that
an agent may introduce a significant bias in the (concurrent) estimation process
of another, so traditional, multiple-point estimation techniques for derivative-free
optimization cannot be applied (at least, not without significant communication
overhead between players).
To do away with player coordination requirements, we focus on learning pro-
cesses which could be sensibly deployed in a single-agent setting and we show that,
in monotone games, the sequence of play induced by a wide class of no-regret
learning policies converges to Nash equilibrium with probability 1. Furthermore,
by specializing to the class of strongly monotone games, we show that the rate
of convergence is O(n−1/3), i.e., it is nearly optimal with respect to the attainable
O(n−1/2) rate for bandit, single-agent stochastic optimization with strongly convex
and smooth objectives (Agarwal et al., 2010; Shamir, 2013).
We are not aware of a similar Nash equilibrium convergence result for con-
cave games with general convex action spaces and bandit feedback: the analysis
of Mertikopoulos and Zhou (2018) requires first-order feedback, while the analy-
sis of Bervoets et al. (2018) only applies to one-dimensional games. We find this
outcome particularly appealing for practical applications of game theory (e.g., in
network routing) because it shows that in a wide class of (possibly very complicated)
nonlinear games, the Nash equilibrium prediction does not require full rationality,
common knowledge of rationality, flawless execution, or even the knowledge that a
game is being played: a commonly-used, individual no-regret algorithm suffices.
2. Problem setup and preliminaries
2.1. Concave games. Throughout this paper, we will focus on games with a finite
number of players i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N} and continuous action sets. During play,
every player i ∈ N selects an action xi from a compact convex subset Xi of a
di-dimensional normed space Vi; subsequently, based on each player’s individual
objective and the action profile x = (xi;x−i) ≡ (x1, . . . , xN ) of all players’ actions,
every player receives a reward, and the process repeats. In more detail, writing
X ≡ ∏i Xi for the game’s action space, we assume that each player’s reward is
determined by an associated payoff (or utility) function ui : X → R. Since players
are not assumed to “know the game” (or even that they are involved in one) these
payoff functions might be a priori unknown, especially with respect to the depen-
dence on the actions of other players. Our only structural assumption for ui will
be that ui(xi;x−i) is concave in xi for all x−i ∈ X−i ≡
∏
j 6=i Xj , i ∈ N .
With all this in hand, a concave game will be a tuple G ≡ G(N ,X , u) with
players, action spaces and payoffs defined as above. Below, we briefly discuss some
examples thereof:
Example 2.1 (Cournot competition). In the standard Cournot oligopoly model,
there is a finite set of firms indexed by i = 1, . . . , N , each supplying the market
with a quantity xi ∈ [0, Ci] of some good (or service), up to the firm’s production
capacity Ci. By the law of supply and demand, the good is priced as a decreasing
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function P (xtot) of the total amount xtot =
∑N
i=1 xi supplied to the market, typi-
cally following a linear model of the form P (xtot) = a− bxtot for positive constants
a, b > 0. The utility of firm i is then given by
ui(xi;x−i) = xiP (xtot)− cixi, (2.1)
i.e., it comprises the total revenue from producing xi units of the good in question
minus the associated production cost (in the above, ci > 0 represents the marginal
production cost of firm i).
Example 2.2 (Resource allocation auctions). Consider a service provider with a
number of splittable resources s ∈ S = {1, . . . , S} (bandwidth, server time, GPU
cores, etc.). These resources can be leased to a set of N bidders (players) who
can place monetary bids xis ≥ 0 for the utilization of each resource s ∈ S up to
each player’s total budget bi, i.e.,
∑
s∈S xis ≤ bi. Once all bids are in, resources
are allocated proportionally to each player’s bid, i.e., the i-th player gets ρis =
(qsxis)
/
(cs +
∑
j∈N xjs) units of the s-th resource (where qs denotes the available
units of said resource and cs ≥ 0 is the “entry barrier” for bidding on it). A simple
model for the utility of player i is then given by
ui(xi;x−i) =
∑
s∈S
[giρis − xis], (2.2)
with gi denoting the marginal gain of player i from acquiring a unit slice of resources.
2.2. Nash equilibrium and monotone games. The most widely used solution concept
for non-cooperative games is that of a Nash equilibrium (NE), defined here as any
action profile x∗ ∈ X that is resilient to unilateral deviations, viz.
ui(x
∗
i ;x
∗
−i) ≥ ui(xi;x∗−i) for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ N . (NE)
By the classical existence theorem of Debreu (1952), every concave game admits a
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, thanks to the individual concavity of the game’s payoff
functions, Nash equilibria can also be characterized via the first-order optimality
condition
〈vi(x∗), xi − x∗i 〉 ≤ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi, (2.3)
where vi(x) denotes the individual payoff gradient of the i-th player, i.e.,
vi(x) = ∇i ui(xi;x−i), (2.4)
with ∇i denoting differentiation with respect to xi.1 In terms of regularity, it will
be convenient to assume that each vi is Lipschitz continuous; to streamline our
presentation, this will be our standing assumption in what follows.
Starting with the seminal work of Rosen (1965), much of the literature on con-
tinuous games and their applications has focused on games that satisfy a condition
known as diagonal strict concavity (DSC). In its simplest form, this condition posits
that there exist positive constants λi > 0 such that∑
i∈N
λi〈vi(x′)− vi(x), x′i − xi〉 < 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X , x 6= x′. (DSC)
Owing to the formal similarity between (DSC) and the various operator monotonic-
ity conditions in optimization (see e.g., Bauschke and Combettes, 2017), games
that satisfy (DSC) are commonly referred to as (strictly) monotone. As was shown
1We adopt here the standard convention of treating vi(x) as an element of the dual space
Yi ≡ V∗i of Vi, with 〈yi, xi〉 denoting the duality pairing between yi ∈ Yi and xi ∈ Xi ⊆ Vi.
BANDIT LEARNING IN CONCAVE N-PERSON GAMES 5
by Rosen (1965, Theorem 2), monotone games admit a unique Nash equilibrium
x∗ ∈ X , which, in view of (DSC) and (NE), is also the unique solution of the
(weighted) variational inequality∑
i∈N
λi〈vi(x), xi − x∗i 〉 < 0 for all x 6= x∗. (VI)
This property of Nash equilibria of monotone games will play a crucial role in our
analysis and we will use it freely in the rest of our paper.
In terms of applications, monotonicity gives rise to a very rich class of games. As
we show in the paper’s supplement, Examples 2.1 and 2.2 both satisfy diagonal strict
concavity (with a nontrivial choice of weights for the latter), as do atomic splittable
congestion games in networks with parallel links (Orda et al., 1993; Sorin and Wan,
2016), multi-user covariance matrix optimization problems in multiple-input and
multiple-output (MIMO) systems (Mertikopoulos et al., 2017), and many other
problems where online decision-making is the norm. Namely, the class of monotone
games contains all strictly convex-concave zero-sum games and all games that admit
a (strictly) concave potential, i.e., a function f : X → R such that vi(x) = ∇i f(x)
for all x ∈ X , i ∈ N . In view of all this (and unless explicitly stated otherwise), we
will focus throughout on monotone games; for completeness, we also include in the
supplement a straightforward second-order test for monotonicity.
3. Regularized no-regret learning
We now turn to the learning methods that players could employ to increase their
individual rewards in an online manner. Building on Zinkevich’s (2003) online
gradient descent policy, the most widely used algorithmic schemes for no-regret
learning in the context of online convex optimization invariably revolve around the
idea of regularization. To name but the most well-known paradigms, “following
the regularized leader” (FTRL) explicitly relies on best-responding to a regularized
aggregate of the reward functions revealed up to a given stage, while online mirror
descent (OMD) and its variants use a linear surrogate thereof. All these no-regret
policies fall under the general umbrella of “regularized learning” and their origins
can be traced back to the seminal mirror descent (MD) algorithm of Nemirovski
and Yudin (1983).2
The basic idea of mirror descent is to generate a new feasible point x+ by taking a
so-called “mirror step” from a starting point x along the direction of an “approximate
gradient” vector y (which we treat here as an element of the dual space Y ≡∏i Yi
of V ≡ ∏i Vi).3 To do so, let hi : Xi → R be a continuous and Ki-strongly convex
distance-generating (or regularizer) function, i.e.,
hi(txi + (1− t)x′i) ≤ thi(xi) + (1− t)hi(x′i)− 12Kit(1 − t)‖x′i − xi‖2, (3.1)
for all xi, x
′
i ∈ Xi and all t ∈ [0, 1]. In terms of smoothness (and in a slight abuse of
notation) we also assume that the subdifferential of hi admits a continuous selection,
2In a utility maximization setting, mirror descent should be called mirror ascent because
players seek to maximize their rewards (as opposed to minimizing their losses). Nonetheless, we
keep the term “descent” throughout because, despite the role reversal, it is the standard name
associated with the method.
3For concreteness (and in a slight abuse of notation), we assume in what follows that V is
equipped with the product norm ‖x‖2 =
∑
i‖xi‖
2 and Y with the dual norm ‖y‖∗ = max{〈y, x〉 :
‖x‖ ≤ 1}.
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i.e., a continuous function ∇hi : dom ∂hi → Yi such that ∇hi(xi) ∈ ∂hi(xi) for all
xi ∈ dom ∂hi.4 Then, letting h(x) =
∑
i hi(xi) for x ∈ X (so h is strongly convex
with modulus K = miniKi), we get a pseudo-distance on X via the relation
D(p, x) = h(p)− h(x) − 〈∇h(x), p− x〉, (3.2)
for all p ∈ X , x ∈ dom ∂h.
This pseudo-distance is known as the Bregman divergence and we haveD(p, x) ≥
0 with equality if and only if x = p; on the other hand, D may fail to be symmetric
and/or satisfy the triangle inequality so, in general, it is not a bona fide distance
function on X . Nevertheless, we also have D(p, x) ≥ 12K‖x − p‖2 (see the paper’s
supplement), so the convergence of a sequence Xn to p can be checked by showing
that D(p,Xn) → 0. For technical reasons, it will be convenient to also assume
the converse, i.e., that D(p,Xn) → 0 when Xn → p. This condition is known
in the literature as “Bregman reciprocity” (Chen and Teboulle, 1993), and it will
be our blanket assumption in what follows (note that it is trivially satisfied by
Examples 3.1 and 3.2 below).
Now, as with true Euclidean distances, D(p, x) induces a prox-mapping given by
Px(y) = argmin
x′∈X
{〈y, x− x′〉+D(x′, x)} (3.3)
for all x ∈ dom ∂h and all y ∈ Y. Just like its Euclidean counterpart below,
the prox-mapping (3.3) starts with a point x ∈ dom ∂h and steps along the dual
(gradient-like) vector y ∈ Y to produce a new feasible point x+ = Px(y). Standard
examples of this process are:
Example 3.1 (Euclidean projections). Let h(x) = 12‖x‖22 denote the Euclidean
squared norm. Then, the induced prox-mapping is
Px(y) = Π(x+ y), (3.4)
with Π(x) = argminx′∈X ‖x′ − x‖2 denoting the standard Euclidean projection
onto X . Hence, the update rule x+ = Px(y) boils down to a “vanilla”, Euclidean
projection step along y.
Example 3.2 (Entropic regularization and multiplicative weights). Suppressing the
player index for simplicity, let X be a d-dimensional simplex and consider the
entropic regularizer h(x) =
∑d
j=1 xj log xj . The induced pseudo-distance is the
so-called Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence DKL(p, x) =
∑d
j=1 pj log(pj/xj), which
gives rise to the prox-mapping
Px(y) =
(xj exp(yj))
d
j=1∑d
j=1 xj exp(yj)
(3.5)
for all x ∈ X ◦, y ∈ Y. The update rule x+ = Px(y) is widely known as the
multiplicative weights (MW) algorithm and plays a central role for learning in multi-
armed bandit problems and finite games (Arora et al., 2012; Auer et al., 1995;
Freund and Schapire, 1999).
4Recall here that the subdifferential of hi at xi ∈ Xi is defined as ∂hi(xi) ≡ {yi ∈ Yi : hi(x′i) ≥
hi(xi)+〈yi, x′i−xi〉 for all x
′
i ∈ Vi}, with the standard convention that hi(xi) = +∞ if xi ∈ Vi\Xi.
By standard results, the domain of subdifferentiability ∂hi ≡ {xi ∈ Xi : ∂hi 6= ∅} of hi satisfies
X ◦i ⊆ dom ∂hi ⊆ Xi.
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With all this in hand, the multi-agent mirror descent (MD) algorithm is given
by the recursion
Xn+1 = PXn(γnvˆn), (MD)
where γn is a variable step-size sequence and vˆn = (vˆi,n)i∈N is a generic feedback
sequence of estimated gradients. In the next section, we detail how this sequence
is generated with first- or zeroth-order (bandit) feedback.
4. First-order vs. bandit feedback
4.1. First-order feedback. A common assumption in the literature is that players
are able to obtain gradient information by querying a first-order oracle (Nesterov,
2004). i.e., a “black-box” feedback mechanism that outputs an estimate vˆi of the
individual payoff gradient vi(x) of the i-th player at the current action profile x =
(xi;x−i) ∈ X . This estimate could be either perfect, giving vˆi = vi(x) for all i ∈ N ,
or imperfect, returning noisy information of the form vˆi = vi(x) + Ui where Ui
denotes the oracle’s error (random, systematic, or otherwise).
Having access to a perfect oracle is usually a tall order, either because payoff
gradients are difficult to compute directly (especially without global knowledge),
because they involve an expectation over a possibly unknown probability law, or
for any other number of reasons. It is therefore more common to assume that each
player has access to a stochastic oracle which, when called against a sequence of
actions Xn ∈ X , produces a sequence of gradient estimates vˆn = (vi,n)i∈N that
satisfies the following statistical assumptions:
a) Unbiasedness: E[vˆn | Fn] = v(Xn).
b) Finite mean square: E[‖vˆn‖2∗ | Fn] ≤ V 2 for some finite V ≥ 0.
(4.1)
In terms of measurability, the expectation in (4.1) is conditioned on the history Fn
of Xn up to stage n; in particular, since vˆn is generated randomly from Xn, it is not
Fn-measurable (and hence not adapted). To make this more transparent, we will
write vˆn = v(Xn) + Un+1 where Un is an adapted martingale difference sequence
with E[‖Un+1‖2∗ | Fn] ≤ σ2 for some finite σ ≥ 0.
4.2. Bandit feedback. Now, if players don’t have access to a first-order oracle – the
so-called bandit or payoff-based framework – they will need to derive an individual
gradient estimate from the only information at their disposal: the actual payoffs
they receive at each stage. When a function can be queried at multiple points
(as few as two in practice), there are efficient ways to estimate its gradient via
directional sampling techniques as in Agarwal et al. (2010). In a game-theoretic
setting however, multiple-point estimation techniques do not apply because, in
general, a player’s payoff function depends on the actions of all players. Thus, when
a player attempts to get a second query of their payoff function, this function may
have already changed due to the query of another player – i.e., instead of sampling
ui(·;x−i), the i-th player would be sampling ui(·;x′−i) for some x′−i 6= x−i.
Following Spall (1997) and Flaxman et al. (2005), we posit instead that players
rely on a simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) approach
that allows them to estimate their individual payoff gradients vi based off a single
function evaluation. In detail, the key steps of this one-shot estimation process for
each player i ∈ N are:
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(0) Fix a query radius δ > 0.5
(1) Pick a pivot point xi ∈ Xi where player i seeks to estimate their payoff
gradient.
(2) Draw a vector zi from the unit sphere Si ≡ Sdi of Vi ≡ Rdi and play
xˆi = xi + δzi.
6
(3) Receive uˆi = ui(xˆi; xˆ−i) and set
vˆi =
di
δ
uˆi zi. (4.2)
By adapting a standard argument based on Stokes’ theorem (detailed in the
supplement), it can be shown that vˆi is an unbiased estimator of the individual
gradient of the δ-smoothed payoff function
uδi (x) =
1
vol(δBi)
∏
j 6=i vol(δSj)
∫
δBi
∫
∏
j 6=i δSj
ui(xi+wi;x−i+z−i) dz1 · · · dwi · · · dzN
(4.3)
with Bi ≡ Bdi denoting the unit ball of Vi. The Lipschitz continuity of vi guarantees
that ‖∇i ui−∇i uδi ‖∞ = O(δ), so this estimate becomes more and more accurate as
δ → 0+. On the other hand, the second moment of vˆi grows as O(1/δ2), implying
in turn that the variability of vˆi grows unbounded as δ → 0+. This manifestation of
the bias-variance dilemma plays a crucial role in designing no-regret policies with
bandit feedback (Flaxman et al., 2005; Kleinberg, 2004), so δ must be chosen with
care.
Before dealing with this choice though, it is important to highlight two feasibility
issues that arise with the single-shot SPSA estimate (4.2). The first has to do with
the fact that the perturbation direction zi is chosen from the unit sphere Si so it
may fail to be tangent to Xi, even when xi is interior. To iron out this wrinkle, it
suffices to sample zi from the intersection of Si with the affine hull of Xi in Vi; on
that account (and without loss of generality), we will simply assume in what follows
that each Xi is a convex body of Vi, i.e., it has nonempty topological interior.
The second feasibility issue concerns the size of the perturbation step: even if zi
is a feasible direction of motion, the query point xˆi = xi + δzi may be unfeasible if
xi is too close to the boundary of Xi. For this reason, we will introduce a “safety
net” in the spirit of Agarwal et al. (2010), and we will constrain the set of possible
pivot points xi to lie within a suitably shrunk zone of X .
In detail, let Bri(pi) be an ri-ball centered at pi ∈ Xi so that Bri(pi) ⊆ Xi. Then,
instead of perturbing xi by zi, we consider the feasibility adjustment
wi = zi − r−1i (xi − pi), (4.4)
and each player plays xˆi = xi + δwi instead of xi + δzi. In other words, this
adjustment moves each pivot to xδi = xi − r−1i δ(xi − pi), i.e., O(δ)-closer to the
interior base point pi, and then perturbs x
δ
i by δzi. Feasibility of the query point
is then ensured by noting that
xˆi = x
δ
i + δzi = (1− r−1i δ)xi + r−1i δ(pi + rizi), (4.5)
so xˆi ∈ Xi if δ/ri < 1 (since pi + rizi ∈ Bri(pi) ⊆ Xi).
5For simplicity, we take δ equal for all players; the extension to player-specific δ is straightfor-
ward, so we omit it.
6We tacitly assume here that the query directions zi ∈ Sdi are drawn independently across
players.
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Algorithm 1: Multi-agent mirror descent with bandit feedback (player indices suppressed)
Require: step-size γn > 0, query radius δn > 0, safety ball Br(p) ⊆ X
1: choose X ∈ dom ∂h # initialization
2: repeat at each stage n = 1, 2, . . .
3: draw Z uniformly from Sd #perturbation direction
4: set W ← Z − r−1(X − p) #query direction
5: play Xˆ ← X + δnW #choose action
6: receive uˆ← u(Xˆ) # get payoff
7: set vˆ ← (d/δn)uˆ · Z # estimate gradient
8: update X ← PX(γnvˆ) #update pivot
9: until end
The difference between this estimator and the oracle framework we discussed
above is twofold. First, each player’s realized action is xˆi = xi+δwi, not xi, so there
is a disparity between the point at which payoffs are queried and the action profile
where the oracle is called. Second, the resulting estimator vˆ is not unbiased, so the
statistical assumptions (4.1) for a stochastic oracle do not hold. In particular, given
the feasibility adjustment (4.4), the estimate (4.2) with xˆ given by (4.5) satisfies
E[vˆi] = ∇i uδi (xδi ;xδ−i), (4.6)
so there are two sources of systematic error: an O(δ) perturbation in the function,
and an O(δ) perturbation of each player’s pivot point from xi to xδi . Hence, to
capture both sources of bias and separate them from the random noise, we will
write
vˆi = vi(x) + Ui + bi (4.7)
where Ui = vˆi−E[vˆi] and bi = ∇i uδi (xδ)−∇i ui(x). We are thus led to the following
manifestation of the bias-variance dilemma: the bias term b in (4.7) is O(δ), but
the second moment of the noise term U is O(1/δ2); as such, an increase in accuracy
(small bias) would result in a commensurate loss of precision (large noise variance).
Balancing these two factors will be a key component of our analysis.
5. Convergence analysis and results
Combining the learning framework of Section 3 with the single-shot gradient
estimation machinery of Section 4, we obtain the following variant of (MD) with
payoff-based, bandit feedback:
Xˆn = Xn + δnWn,
Xn+1 = PXn(γnvˆn).
(MD-b)
In the above, the perturbations Wn and the estimates vˆn are given respectively by
(4.4) and (4.2), i.e.,
Wi,n = Zi,n − r−1i (Xi,n − pi) vˆi,n = (di/δn)ui(Xˆn)Zi,n (5.1)
and Zi,n is drawn independently and uniformly across players at each stage n (see
also Algorithm 1 for a pseudocode implementation and Fig. 1 for a schematic rep-
resentation).
In the rest of this paper, our goal will be to determine the equilibrium conver-
gence properties of this scheme in concave N -person games. Our first asymptotic
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X
X1
.
Xˆ1
.
γ(d/δ) uˆ1z1
δz1
.
X2
Π
.
Xˆ2
.
X3
γ(d/δ) uˆ2z2
δz2
Figure 1: Schematic representation of Algorithm 1 with ordinary, Eu-
clidean projections. To reduce visual clutter, we did not include the
feasibility adjustment r−1(x− p) in the action selection step Xn 7→ Xˆn.
result below shows that, under (MD-b), the players’ learning process converges to
Nash equilibrium in monotone games:
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that the players of a monotone game G ≡ G(N ,X , u) follow
(MD-b) with step-size γn and query radius δn such that
lim
n→∞
γn = lim
n→∞
δn = 0,
∞∑
n=1
γn =∞,
∞∑
n=1
γnδn <∞, and
∞∑
n=1
γ2n
δ2n
<∞.
(5.2)
Then, the sequence of realized actions Xˆn converges to Nash equilibrium with prob-
ability 1.
Even though the setting is different, the conditions (5.2) for the tuning of the
algorithm’s parameters are akin to those encountered in Kiefer–Wolfowitz stochas-
tic approximation schemes and serve a similar purpose. First, the conditions
limn→∞ γn = 0 and
∑∞
n=1 γn =∞ respectively mitigate the method’s inherent ran-
domness and ensure a horizon of sufficient length. The requirement limn→∞ δn = 0
is also straightforward to explain: as players accrue more information, they need to
decrease the sampling bias in order to have any hope of converging. However, as we
discussed in Section 4, decreasing δ also increases the variance of the players’ gradi-
ent estimates, which might grow to infinity as δ → 0. The crucial observation here
is that new gradients enter the algorithm with a weight of γn so the aggregate bias
after n stages is of the order of O(∑nk=1 γkδk) and its variance is O(∑nk=1 γ2k/δ2k).
If these error terms can be controlled, there is an underlying drift that emerges
over time and which steers the process to equilibrium. We make this precise in the
supplement by using a suitably adjusted variant of the Bregman divergence as a
quasi-Féjér energy function for (MD-b) and relying on a series of (sub)martingale
convergence arguments to establish the convergence of Xˆn (first as a subsequence,
then with probability 1).
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Of course, since Theorem 5.1 is asymptotic in nature, it is not clear how to
choose γn and δn so as to optimize the method’s convergence rate. Heuristically,
if we take schedules of the form γn = γ/n
p and δn = δ/n
q with γ, δ > 0 and
0 < p, q ≤ 1, the only conditions imposed by (5.2) are p + q > 1 and p − q >
1/2. However, as we discussed above, the aggregate bias in the algorithm after
n stages is O(∑nk=1 γnδn) = O(1/np+q−1) and its variance is O(∑nk=1 γ2k/δ2k) =
O(1/n2p−2q−1): if the conditions (5.2) are satisfied, both error terms vanish, but
they might do so at very different rates. By equating these exponents in order to
bridge this gap, we obtain q = p/3; moreover, since the single-shot SPSA estimator
(4.2) introduces a Θ(δn) random perturbation, q should be taken as large as possible
to ensure that this perturbation vanishes at the fastest possible rate. As a result,
the most suitable choice for p and q seems to be p = 1, q = 1/3, leading to an error
bound of O(1/n1/3).
We show below that this bound is indeed attainable for games that are strongly
monotone, i.e., they satisfy the following stronger variant of diagonal strict concav-
ity: ∑
i∈N
λi〈vi(x′)− vi(x), x′i − xi〉 ≤ −
β
2
‖x− x′‖2 (β-DSC)
for some λi, β > 0 and for all x, x
′ ∈ X . Focusing for expository reasons on the
most widely used, Euclidean incarnation of the method (Example 3.1), we have:
Theorem 5.2. Let x∗ be the (necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium of a β-strongly
monotone game. If the players follow (MD-b) with Euclidean projections and pa-
rameters γn = γ/n and δn = δ/n
1/3 with γ > 1/(3β) and δ > 0, we have
E[‖Xˆn − x∗‖2] = O(n−1/3). (5.3)
Theorem 5.2 is our main finite-time analysis result, so some remarks are in
order. First, the step-size schedule γn ∝ 1/n is not required to obtain an O(n−1/3)
convergence rate: as we show in the paper’s supplement, more general schedules of
the form γn ∝ 1/np and δn ∝ 1/nq with p > 3/4 and q = p/3 > 1/4, still guarantee
an O(n−1/3) rate of convergence for (MD-b). To put things in perspective, we
also show in the supplement that if (MD) is run with first-order oracle feedback
satisfying the statistical assumptions (4.1), the rate of convergence becomes O(1/n).
Viewed in this light, the price for not having access to gradient information is no
higher than O(n−2/3) in terms of the players’ equilibration rate.
Finally, it is also worth comparing the bound (D.2) to the attainable rates for
stochastic convex optimization (the single-player case). For problems with objec-
tives that are both strongly convex and smooth, Agarwal et al. (2010) attained an
O(n−1/2) convergence rate with bandit feedback, which Shamir (2013) showed is
unimprovable. Thus, in the single-player case, the bound (D.2) is off by n1/6 and
coincides with the bound of Agarwal et al. (2010) for strongly convex functions that
are not necessarily smooth. One reason for this gap is that the Θ(n−1/2) bound of
Shamir (2013) concerns the smoothed-out time average X¯n = n
−1
∑n
k=1Xk, while
our analysis concerns the sequence of realized actions Xˆn. This difference is semanti-
cally significant: In optimization, the query sequence is just a means to an end, and
only the algorithm’s output matters (i.e., X¯n). In a game-theoretic setting however,
it is the players’ realized actions that determine their rewards at each stage, so the
figure of merit is the actual sequence of play Xˆn. This sequence is more difficult
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to control, so this disparity is, perhaps, not too surprising; nevertheless, we believe
that this gap can be closed by using a more sophisticated single-shot estimate, e.g.,
as in Ghadimi and Lan (2013). We defer this analysis to the future.
6. Concluding remarks
The most sensible choice for agents who are oblivious to the presence of each
other (or who are simply conservative), is to deploy a no-regret learning algorithm.
With this in mind, we studied the long-run behavior of individual regularized no-
regret learning policies and we showed that, in monotone games, play converges
to equilibrium with probability 1, and the rate of convergence almost matches
the optimal rates of single-agent, stochastic convex optimization. Nevertheless,
several questions remain open: whether there is an intrinsic information-theoretic
obstacle to bridging this gap; whether our convergence rate estimates hold with
high probability (and not just in expectation); and whether our analysis extends to
a fully decentralized setting where the players’ updates need not be synchronous.
We intend to address these questions in future work.
Appendix A. Monotone games
Our aim in this appendix is to show that the game-theoretic examples of Sec-
tion 2 are both monotone. Before studying them in detail, it will be convenient to
introduce a straightforward second-order test for monotonicity based on the game’s
Hessian matrix.
Specifically, extending the notion of the Hessian of an ordinary (scalar) function,
the (λ-weighted) Hessian of a game G is defined as the block matrix HG(x;λ) =
(Hij(x;λ))i,j∈N with blocks
Hij(x;λ) =
λi
2
∇j ∇i ui(x) + λj
2
(∇i∇j uj(x))⊤. (A.1)
As was shown by Rosen (1965, Theorem 6), G satisifes (DSC) with weight vector
λ whenever z⊤HG(x;λ)z < 0 for all x ∈ X and all nonzero z ∈ V ≡
∏
i Vi that are
tangent to X at x.7 It is thus common to check for monotonicity by taking λi = 1
for all i ∈ N and verifying whether the unweighted Hessian of G is negative-definite
on the affine hull of X .
A.1. Cournot competition (Example 2.1). In the standard Cournot oligopoly model
described in the main body of the paper, the players’ payoff functions are given by
ui(x) = xi
(
a− b∑j xj)− cixi. (A.2)
Consequently, a simple differentiation yields
Hij(x) =
1
2
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
+
1
2
∂2uj
∂xj∂xi
= −b(1 + δij), (A.3)
where δij = 1{i = j} is the Kronecker delta. This matrix is clearly negative-definite,
so the game is monotone.
7By “tangent” we mean here that z belongs to the tangent cone TC(x) to X at x, i.e., the
intersection of all supporting (closed) half-spaces of X at x.
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A.2. Resource allocation auctions (Example 2.2). In our auction-theoretic example,
the players’ payoff functions are given by
ui(xi;x−i) =
∑
s∈S
[
giqsxis
cs +
∑
j∈N xjs
− xis
]
(A.4)
To prove monotonicity in this example, we will consider the following criterion
due to Goodman (1980): a game G satisfies (DSC) with weights λi, i ∈ N , if:
a) Each payoff function ui is strictly concave in xi and convex in x−i.
b) The function
∑
i∈N λiui(x) is concave in x.
Since the function φ(x) = x/(c+x) is strictly concave in x for all c > 0, the first
condition above is trivial to verify. For the second, letting λi = 1/gi gives∑
i∈N
λiui(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈S
qsxis
cs +
∑
j∈N xjs
−
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈S
xis
=
∑
s∈S
qs
∑
i∈N xis
cs +
∑
i∈N xis
−
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈S
xis. (A.5)
Since the summands above are all concave in their respective arguments, our claim
follows.
Appendix B. Properties of Bregman proximal mappings
In this appendix, we provide some auxiliary results and estimates that are used
throughout the convergence analysis of Appendix C. Some of the results we present
here are not new (see e.g., Nemirovski et al., 2009); however, the set of hypotheses
used to obtain them varies widely in the literature, so we provide all proofs for
completeness.
In what follows, we will make frequent use of the convex conjugate h∗ : Y → R
of h, defined here as
h∗(y) = max
x∈X
{〈y, x〉 − h(x)}. (B.1)
By standard results in convex analysis (Rockafellar, 1970, Chap. 26), h∗ is differen-
tiable on Y and its gradient satisfies the identity
∇h∗(y) = argmax
x∈X
{〈y, x〉 − h(x)}. (B.2)
For notational convenience, we will also write
Q(y) = ∇h∗(y) (B.3)
and we will refer to Q : Y → X as the mirror map generated by h.
Together with the prox-mapping induced by h, all these notions are related as
follows:
Lemma B.1. Let h be a regularizer on X . Then, for all x ∈ dom ∂h, y ∈ Y, we
have:
a) x = Q(y) ⇐⇒ y ∈ ∂h(x). (B.4a)
b) x+ = Px(y) ⇐⇒ ∇h(x) + y ∈ ∂h(x+) ⇐⇒ x+ = Q(∇h(x) + y).
(B.4b)
Finally, if x = Q(y) and p ∈ X , we have
〈∇h(x), x − p〉 ≤ 〈y, x− p〉. (B.5)
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Remark. Note that (B.4b) directly implies that ∂h(x+) 6= ∅, i.e., x+ ∈ dom∂h. An
immediate consequence of this is that the update rule x← Px(y) is well-posed, i.e.,
it can be iterated in perpetuity.
Proof of Lemma B.1. To prove (B.4a), note that x solves (B.2) if and only if y −
∂h(x) ∋ 0, i.e., if and only if y ∈ ∂h(x). Similarly, for (B.4b), comparing (3.3) and
(B.1), we see that x+ solves (3.3) if and only if ∇h(x) + y ∈ ∂h(x+), i.e., if and
only if x+ = Q(∇h(x) + y).
For the inequality (B.5), it suffices to show it holds for interior p ∈ X ◦ (by
continuity). To do so, let
φ(t) = h(x+ t(p− x))− [h(x) + 〈y, x+ t(p− x)〉]. (B.6)
Since h is strongly convex and y ∈ ∂h(x) by (B.4a), it follows that φ(t) ≥ 0 with
equality if and only if t = 0. Moreover, note that ψ(t) = 〈∇h(x+t(p−x))−y, p−x〉 is
a continuous selection of subgradients of φ. Given that φ and ψ are both continuous
on [0, 1], it follows that φ is continuously differentiable and φ′ = ψ on [0, 1]. Thus,
with φ convex and φ(t) ≥ 0 = φ(0) for all t ∈ [0, 1], we conclude that φ′(0) =
〈∇h(x)− y, p− x〉 ≥ 0, from which our claim follows. 
We continue with some basic relations connecting the Bregman divergence rel-
ative to a target point before and after a prox step. The basic ingredient for this
is a generalization of the law of cosines which is known in the literature as the
“three-point identity” (Chen and Teboulle, 1993):
Lemma B.2. Let h be a regularizer on X . Then, for all p ∈ X and all x, x′ ∈ dom ∂h,
we have
D(p, x′) = D(p, x) +D(x, x′) + 〈∇h(x′)−∇h(x), x− p〉. (B.7)
Proof. By definition, we get:
D(p, x′) = h(p)− h(x′)− 〈∇h(x′), p− x′〉
D(p, x) = h(p)− h(x)− 〈∇h(x), p− x〉
D(x, x′) = h(x) − h(x′)− 〈∇h(x′), x− x′〉.
(B.8)
The lemma then follows by adding the two last lines and subtracting the first. 
With all this at hand, we have the following upper and lower bounds:
Proposition B.3. Let h be a K-strongly convex regularizer on X , fix some p ∈ X ,
and let x+ = Px(y) for x ∈ dom ∂h, y ∈ Y. Then, we have:
D(p, x) ≥ K
2
‖x− p‖2. (B.9a)
D(p, x+) ≤ D(p, x)−D(x+, x) + 〈y, x+ − p〉 (B.9b)
≤ D(p, x) + 〈y, x− p〉+ 1
2K
‖y‖2∗ (B.9c)
Proof of (B.9a). By the strong convexity of h, we get
h(p) ≥ h(x) + 〈∇h(x), p − x〉+ K
2
‖p− x‖2 (B.10)
so (B.9a) follows by gathering all terms involving h and recalling the definition of
D(p, x). 
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Proof of B.9b and (B.9c). By the three-point identity (B.7), we readily obtain
D(p, x) = D(p, x+) +D(x+, x) + 〈∇h(x) −∇h(x+), x+ − p〉, (B.11)
and hence:
D(p, x+) = D(p, x)−D(x+, x) + 〈∇h(x+)−∇h(x), x+ − p〉
≤ D(p, x)−D(x+, x) + 〈y, x+ − p〉, (B.12)
where, in the last step, we used (B.5) and the fact that x+ = Q(∇h(x) + y), by
(B.4b), since x+ = Px(y). The above is just (B.9b), so the first part of our proof is
complete.
To proceed with the proof of (B.9c), note that (B.12) gives
D(p, x+) ≤ D(p, x) + 〈y, x− p〉+ 〈y, x+ − x〉 −D(x+, x). (B.13)
By Young’s inequality (Rockafellar, 1970), we also have
〈y, x+ − x〉 ≤ K
2
‖x+ − x‖2 + 1
2K
‖y‖2∗, (B.14)
and hence
D(p, x+) ≤ D(p, x) + 〈y, x− p〉+ 1
2K
‖y‖2∗ +
K
2
‖x+ − x‖2 −D(x+, x)
≤ D(p, x) + 〈y, x− p〉+ 1
2K
‖y‖2∗, (B.15)
with the last step following from Lemma B.1 after plugging in x in place of p. 
Appendix C. Asymptotic convergence analysis
Our goal in this appendix is to prove Theorem 5.1. Our proof strategy will be
based on a two-pronged approach. First, we will show that the pivot sequence Xn
satisfies a “quasi-Fejér” property (Combettes, 2001; Combettes and Pesquet, 2015)
with respect to the Bregman divergence. This quasi-Fejér property allows us to show
that the Bregman divergence D(x∗, Xn) with respect to a Nash equilibrium x
∗ of
G converges. To show that this limit is actually zero for some Nash equilibrium,
we prove that, with probability 1, the sequence Xn admits a (random) subsequence
that converges to a Nash equilibrium. The theorem then follows by combining these
two results.
To carry all this out, we begin with an auxiliary lemma for the SPSA estimation
process of Section 4:
Lemma C.1. The SPSA estimator vˆ = (vˆi)i∈N given by (4.2) satisfies
E[vˆi] = ∇i uδi , (C.1)
with uδi as in (4.3). Moreover, we have ‖∇i uδi −∇i ui‖∞ = O(δ).
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Proof. By the independence of the sampling directions zi, i ∈ N , we have
E[vˆi] =
di/δ∏
j vol(Sj)
∫
S1
· · ·
∫
SN
ui(x1 + δz1, . . . , xN + δzN)zi dz1 · · · dzN
=
di/δ∏
j vol(δSj)
∫
δS1
· · ·
∫
δSN
ui(x1 + z1, . . . , xN + zN )
zi
‖zi‖ dz1 · · · dzN
=
di/δ∏
j vol(δSj)
∫
δSi
∫
∏
j 6=i δSj
ui(xi + zi;x−i + z−i)
zi
‖zi‖ dzi dz−i
=
di/δ∏
j vol(δSj)
∫
δBi
∫
∏
j 6=i δSj
∇i ui(xi + wi;x−i + z−i) dwi dz−i, (C.2)
where, in the last line, we used the identity
∇
∫
δB
f(x+ w) dw =
∫
δS
f(x+ z)
z
‖z‖ dz (C.3)
which, in turn, follows from Stokes’ theorem (Flaxman et al., 2005; Lee, 2003).
Since vol(δBi) = (δ/di) vol(δSi), the above yields E[vˆi] = ∇i uδi with uδi given by
(4.3).
For the second part of the lemma, let Li denote the Lipschitz constant of vi, i.e.,
‖vi(x′) − vi(x)‖∗ ≤ Li‖x′ − x‖ for all x, x′ ∈ X . Then, for all wi ∈ δBi and all
zj ∈ δSj , j 6= i, we have
‖∇i ui(xi+wi;x−i+z−i)−∇i ui(x)‖ ≤ Li
√
‖wi‖2 +
∑
j 6=i
‖zj‖2 ≤ Li
√
Nδ. (C.4)
Our assertion then follows by integrating and differentiating under the integral
sign. 
With this basic estimate at hand, we proceed to establish the convergence of the
Bregman divergence relative to the game’s Nash equilibria:
Proposition C.2. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of G. Then, with assumptions as in
Theorem 5.1, the Bregman divergence D(x∗, Xn) converges (a.s.) to a finite random
variable D∞.
Remark. For expository reasons, we tacitly assume above (and in what follows) that
G satisfies (DSC) with weights λi = 1 for all i ∈ N . If this is not the case, the
Bregman divergence D(p, x) should be replaced by the weight-adjusted variant
Dλ(p, x) =
∑
i∈N
λiD(pi, xi). (C.5)
Since this adjustment would force us to carry around all player indices, the presen-
tation would become significantly more cumbersome; to avoid this, we stick with
the simpler, unweighted case.
Proof. Let Dn = D(x
∗, Xn) for some Nash equilibrium x
∗ of G and write
vˆn = v(Xn) + Un+1 + bn, (C.6)
where, recalling the setup of Section 4 in the main body of the paper, the noise
process Un+1 = vˆn−E[vˆn | Fn] is an Fn-adapted martingale difference sequence and
bn = v
δn(Xδnn )− v(Xn) denotes the systematic bias of the estimator vˆn.8 Then, by
8Recall here that Xδi , i ∈ N , denotes the δ-adjusted pivot X
δ
i = Xi + r
−1
i δ(Xi − pi), i.e.,
including the feasibility adjustment r−1i (Xi − pi).
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Proposition B.3, we have
Dn+1 = D(x
∗, PXn(γnvˆn)) ≤ D(x∗, Xn) + γn〈vˆn, Xn − x∗〉+
γ2n
2K
‖vˆn‖2∗
= Dn + γn〈v(Xn) + Un+1 + bn, Xn − x∗〉+ γ
2
n
2K
‖vˆn‖2∗
≤ Dn + γnξn+1 + γnrn + γ
2
n
2K
‖vˆn‖2∗, (C.7)
where, in the last line, we set ξn+1 = 〈Un+1, Xn − x∗〉, rn = 〈bn, Xn − x∗〉, and
we used the variational characterization (VI) of Nash equilibria of monotone games.
Thus, conditioning on Fn and taking expectations, we get
E[Dn+1 | Fn] ≤ Dn + E[ξn+1 | Fn] + γn E[rn | Fn] + γ
2
n
2K
E[‖vˆn‖2∗ | Fn]
≤ Dn + γn E[rn | Fn] + V
2
2K
γ2n
δ2n
. (C.8)
where we set V 2 =
∑
i d
2
i maxx∈X |ui(x)|2 and we used the fact that Xn is Fn-
measurable, so
E[ξn+1 | Fn] = 〈E[Un+1 | Fn], Xn − x∗〉 = 0. (C.9)
Finally, by Lemma C.1, we have
‖bn‖∗ = ‖vδn(Xδnn )− v(Xn)‖∗
≤ ‖vδn(Xδnn )− v(Xδnn )‖∗ + ‖v(Xδnn )− v(Xn)‖∗
= O(δn), (C.10)
where we used the fact that v is Lipschitz continuous and ‖vδ − v‖∞ = O(δ). This
shows that there exists some B > 0 such that rn ≤ Bδn; as a consequence, we
obtain
E[Dn+1 | Fn] ≤ Dn +Bγnδn + V
2
2K
γ2n
δ2n
. (C.11)
Now, letting Rn = Dn +
∑∞
k=n[Bγkδk + (2K)
−1V 2γ2k/δ
2
k], the estimate (C.7)
gives
E[Rn+1 | Fn] = E[Dn+1 | Fn] +
∞∑
k=n+1
[
Bγkδk +
V 2
2K
γ2k
δ2k
]
≤ Dn +Bγnδn + V
2
2K
γ2n
δ2n
+
∞∑
k=n+1
[
Bγkδk +
V 2
2K
γ2k
δ2k
]
≤ Dn +
∞∑
k=n
[
Bγkδk +
V 2
2K
γ2k
δ2k
]
= Rn, (C.12)
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i.e., Rn is an Fn-adapted supermartingale.9 Since the series
∑∞
n=1 γnδn and
∑∞
n=1 γ
2
n/δ
2
n
are both summable, it follows that
E[Rn] = E[E[Rn | Fn−1]]
≤ E[Rn−1] ≤ · · · ≤ E[R1]
≤ E[D1] +
∞∑
n=1
[
Bγnδn +
V 2
2K
γ2n
δ2n
]
<∞ (C.13)
i.e., Rn is uniformly bounded in L
1. Thus, by Doob’s convergence theorem for
supermartingales (Hall and Heyde, 1980, Theorem 2.5), it follows that Rn converges
(a.s.) to some finite random variable R∞. In turn, by inverting the definition of Rn,
it follows that Dn converges (a.s.) to some random variable D∞, as claimed. 
Proposition C.3. Suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 5.1 hold. Then, with
probability 1, there exists a (random) subsequence Xnk of (MD-b) which converges
to Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We begin with the technical observation that the set X ∗ of Nash equilibria
of G is closed (and hence, compact). Indeed, let x∗n, n = 1, 2, . . . , be a sequence of
Nash equilibria converging to some limit point x∗ ∈ X ; to show that X ∗ is closed,
it suffices to show that x∗ ∈ X . However, since Nash equilibria of G satisfy the
variational characterization (VI), we also have 〈v(x), x − x∗n〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X .
Hence, with x∗n → x∗ as n→∞, it follows that
〈v(x), x − x∗〉 = lim
n→∞
〈v(x), x − x∗n〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X , (C.14)
i.e., x∗ satisfies (VI). Since G is monotone, we conclude that x∗ is a Nash equilib-
rium, as claimed.
Suppose now ad absurdum that, with positive probability, the pivot sequenceXn
generated by (MD-b) admits no limit points in X ∗.10 Conditioning on this event,
and given that X ∗ is compact, there exists a (nonempty) compact set C ⊂ X such
that C ∩ X ∗ = ∅ and Xn ∈ C for all sufficiently large n. Moreover, by (VI), we
have 〈v(x), x − x∗〉 < 0 whenever x ∈ C and x∗ ∈ X ∗. Therefore, by the continuity
of v and the compactness of X ∗ and C, there exists some c > 0 such that
〈v(x), x − x∗〉 ≤ −c for all x ∈ C, x∗ ∈ X . (C.15)
To proceed, fix some x∗ ∈ X ∗ and let Dn = D(x∗, Xn) as in the proof of
Proposition C.2. Then, telescoping (C.7) yields the estimate
Dn+1 ≤ D1 +
n∑
k=1
γk〈v(Xn), Xn − x∗〉+
n∑
k=1
γkξk+1 +
n∑
k=1
γkrk +
n∑
k=1
γ2k
2K
‖vˆn‖2∗,
(C.16)
where, as in the proof of Proposition C.2, we set
ξn+1 = 〈Un+1, Xn − x∗〉 (C.17)
and
rn = 〈bn, Xn − x∗〉. (C.18)
9In particular, this shows that E[Dn | Fn−1] is quasi-Fejér in the sense of Combettes (2001).
10We assume here without loss of generality that X ∗ 6= X ; otherwise, there is nothing to show.
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Subsequently, letting τn =
∑n
k=1 γk and using (C.15), we obtain
Dn+1 ≤ D1 − τn
[
c−
∑n
k=1 γkξk+1
τn
−
∑n
k=1 γkrk
τn
− (2K)
−1
∑n
k=1 γ
2
k‖vˆk‖2∗
τn
]
.
(C.19)
Since Un is a martingale difference sequence with respect to Fn, we have E[ξn+1 | Fn] =
0 (recall that Xn is Fn-measurable by construction). Moreover, by construction,
there exists some constant σ > 0 such that
‖Un+1‖2∗ ≤
σ2
δ2n
, (C.20)
and hence:
∞∑
n=1
γ2n E[ξ
2
n+1 | Fn] ≤
∞∑
n=1
γ2n‖Xn − x∗‖2 E[‖Un+1‖2∗ | Fn]
≤ diam(X )2σ2
∞∑
n=1
γ2n
δ2n
<∞. (C.21)
Therefore, by the law of large numbers for martingale difference sequences (Hall
and Heyde, 1980, Theorem 2.18), we conclude that τ−1n
∑n
k=1 γkξk+1 converges to
0 with probability 1.
For the third term in the brackets of (C.19) we have rn → 0 as n → ∞ (a.s.).
Since
∑∞
n=1 γn =∞, it follows
∑n
k=1 γkrk
/∑n
k=1 γk → 0.
Finally, for the last term in the brackets of (C.19), let Sn+1 =
∑n
k=1 γ
2
k‖vˆk‖2∗.
Since vˆk is Fn-measurable for all k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, we have
E[Sn+1 | Fn] = E
[
n−1∑
k=1
γ2k‖vˆk‖2∗ + γ2n‖vˆn‖2∗
∣∣∣∣∣Fn
]
= Sn + γ
2
n E[‖vˆn‖2∗ | Fn] ≥ Sn,
(C.22)
i.e., Sn is a submartingale with respect to Fn. Furthermore, by the law of total
expectation, we also have
E[Sn+1] = E[E[Sn+1 | Fn]] ≤ V 2
n∑
k=1
γ2k
δ2k
≤ V 2
∞∑
k=1
γ2k
δ2k
<∞, (C.23)
implying in turn that Sn is uniformly bounded in L
1. Hence, by Doob’s submartin-
gale convergence theorem (Hall and Heyde, 1980, Theorem 2.5), we conclude that
Sn converges to some (almost surely finite) random variable S∞ with E[S∞] <∞.
Consequently, we have limn→∞ Sn+1/τn = 0 with probability 1.
Applying all of the above to the estimate (C.19), we get Dn+1 ≤ D1 − cτn/2 for
sufficiently large n, and hence, D(x∗, Xn) → −∞, a contradiction. Going back to
our original assumption, this shows that at least one of the limit points of Xn must
lie in X ∗, so our proof is complete. 
We are finally in a position to prove Theorem 5.1 regarding the convergence of
(MD-b):
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By Proposition C.3, there exists a (possibly random) Nash
equilibrium x∗ of G such that ‖Xnk − x∗‖ → 0 for some (random) subsequence
Xnk . By the assumed reciprocity of the Bregman divergence, this implies that
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lim infn→∞D(x
∗, Xn) = 0 (a.s.). Since limn→∞D(x
∗, Xn) exists with probability
1 (by Proposition C.2), it follows that
lim
n→∞
D(x∗, Xn) = lim inf
n→∞
D(x∗, Xn) = 0, (C.24)
i.e., Xn converges to x
∗ by the first part of Proposition B.3. Since δn → 0 and
‖Xˆn −Xn‖ = δn‖Wn‖ = O(δn), our claim follows. 
Appendix D. Finite-time analysis and rates of convergence
We now turn to the finite-time analysis of (MD-b). To begin, we briefly recall
that a game G is β-strongly monotone if it satisfies the condition
∑
i∈N
λi〈vi(x′)− vi(x), x′i − xi〉 ≤ −
β
2
‖x− x′‖2 (β-DSC)
for some λi, β > 0 and for all x, x
′ ∈ X . Our aim in what follows will be to prove
the following convergence rate estimate for multi-agent mirror descent in strongly
monotone games:
Theorem D.1. Let x∗ be the (unique) Nash equilibrium of a β-strongly monotone
game. Then:
a) If the players have access to a gradient oracle satisfying (4.1) and they
follow (MD) with Euclidean projections and step-size sequence γn = γ/n
for some γ > 1/β, we have
E[‖Xn − x∗‖2] = O(n−1). (D.1)
b) If the players only have bandit feedback and they follow (MD-b) with Eu-
clidean projections and parameters γn = γ/n and δn = δ/n
1/3 with γ >
1/(3β) and δ > 0, we have
E[‖Xˆn − x∗‖2] = O(n−1/3). (D.2)
Remark. Theorem 5.2 is recovered by the second part of Theorem D.1 above; the
first part (which was alluded to in the main paper) serves as a benchmark to quantify
the gap between bandit and oracle feedback.
For the proof of Theorem D.1 we will need the following lemma on numerical
sequences, a version of which is often attributed to Chung (1954):
Lemma D.2. Let an, n = 1, 2, . . . , be a non-negative sequence such that
an+1 ≤ an
(
1− P
np
)
+
Q
np+q
(D.3)
where 0 < p ≤ 1, q > 0, and P,Q > 0. Then, assuming P > q if p = 1, we have
an ≤ Q
R
1
nq
+ o
(
1
nq
)
, (D.4)
with R = P if p < 1 and R = P − q if p = 1.
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Proof. Clearly, it suffices to show that lim supn→∞ n
qan ≤ Q/R. To that end, write
qn = n[(1 + 1/n)
q − 1], so (1 + 1/n)q = 1 + qn/n and qn → q as n → ∞. Then,
multiplying both sides of (D.3) by (n+ 1)q and letting a˜n = ann
q, we get
a˜n+1 ≤ an(n+ 1)q
(
1− P
np
)
+
Q(n+ 1)q
np+q
= a˜n
(
1 +
qn
n
)(
1− P
np
)
+
Q(1 + qn/n)
np
= a˜n
[
1 +
qn
n
− P
np
+O
(
1
np+1
)]
+
Qn
np
, (D.5)
where we set Qn = Q(1+qn/n), soQn → Q as n→∞. Then, under the assumption
that P > q when p = 1, (D.5) can be rewritten as
a˜n+1 ≤ a˜n
(
1− Rn
np
)
+
Qn
np
, (D.6)
for some sequence Rn with Rn → R as n→∞.
Now, fix some small enough ε > 0. From (D.6), we readily get
a˜n+1 ≤ a˜n − Rna˜n −Qn
np
. (D.7)
Since Rn → R and Qn → Q as n→ ∞, we will have Rn > R− ε and Qn < Q+ ε
for all n greater than some nε. Thus, if n ≥ nε and (R − ε)a˜n − (Q + ε) > ε, we
will also have
a˜n+1 ≤ a˜n − Rna˜n −Qn
np
≤ a˜n − (R − ε)a˜n − (Q + ε)
np
≤ a˜n − ε
np
. (D.8)
The above shows that, as long as a˜n > (Q + 2ε)/(R − ε), a˜n will decrease at least
by ε/np at each step. In turn, since
∑∞
n=1(1/n
p) = ∞, it follows by telescoping
that lim supn→∞ a˜n ≤ (Q+2ε)/(R− ε). Hence, with ε arbitrary, we conclude that
lim supn→∞ ann
q ≤ Q/R, as claimed. 
Proof of Theorem D.1. We begin with the second part of the theorem; the first
part will follow by setting some estimates equal to zero, so the analysis is more
streamlined that way. Also, as in the previous section, we tacitly assume that
(β-DSC) holds with weights λi = 1 for all i ∈ N . If this is not the case, the Bregman
divergenceD(p, x) should be replaced by the weight-adjusted variant (C.5), but this
would only make the presentation more difficult to follow, so we omit the details.
The main component of our proof is the estimate (C.7), which, for convenience
(and with notation as in the previous section), we also reproduce below:
Dn+1 ≤ Dn + γn〈v(Xn), Xn − x∗〉+ γnξn+1 + γnrn + γ
2
n
2K
‖vˆn‖2∗. (D.9)
In the above, since the algorithm is run with Euclidean projections, Dn =
1
2‖Xn −
x∗‖2; other than that, ξn and rn are defined as in (C.17) and (C.18) respectively.
Since the game is β-strongly monotone and x∗ is a Nash equilibrium, we further
have
〈v(Xn), Xn − x∗〉 ≤ 〈v(Xn)− v(x∗), Xn − x∗〉 ≤ −β
2
‖Xn − x∗‖2 = −βDn, (D.10)
22 M. BRAVO, D. S. LESLIE, AND P. MERTIKOPOULOS
so (D.9) becomes
Dn+1 ≤ (1− βγn)Dn + γnξn+1 + γnrn + γ
2
n
2K
‖vˆn‖2∗. (D.11)
Thus, letting D¯n = E[Dn] and taking expectations, we obtain
D¯n+1 ≤ (1− βγn)D¯n +Bγnδn + V
2
2K
γ2n
δ2n
, (D.12)
with B and V defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 in the previous section.
Now, substituting γn = γ/n
p and δn = δ/n
q in (D.12) readily yields
D¯n+1 ≤
(
1− βγ
np
)
D¯n +
Bγδ
np+q
+
V 2γ2δ2
2Kn2(p−q)
. (D.13)
Hence, taking p = 1 and q = 1/3, the last two exponents are equated, leading to
the estimate
D¯n+1 ≤
(
1− βγ
n
)
D¯n +
C
n4/3
, (D.14)
with C = γδB + (2K)−1γ2δ2V 2. Thus, with βγ > 1/3, applying Lemma D.2 with
p = 1 and q = 1/3, we finally obtain D¯n = O(1/n1/3).
The proof for the oracle case is similar: the key observation is that the bound
(D.12) becomes
D¯n+1 ≤ (1− βγn)D¯n + V
2
2K
γ2n, (D.15)
with V defined as in (4.1). Hence, taking γn = γ/n with βγ > 1 and applying again
Lemma D.2 with p = q = 1, we obtain D¯n = O(1/n) and our proof is complete. 
To conclude, we note that theO(1/n1/3) bound of Theorem D.1 cannot be readily
improved by choosing a different step-size schedule of the form γn ∝ 1/np for some
p < 1. Indeed, applying Lemma D.2 to the estimate (D.13) yields a bound which
is either O(1/nq) or O(1/np−2q), depending on which exponent is larger. Equating
the two exponents (otherwise, one term would be slower than the other), we get
q = p/3, leading again to a O(1/n1/3) bound. Unless one has finer control on the
bias/variance of the SPSA gradient estimator used in (MD-b), we do not see a way
of improving this bound in the current context.
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